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Bigger and Better Patent Examiner Statistics 
Shine Sean Tu1 
Originally Published in 59 IDEA 309 (2018) 
The American government charges the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
(USPTO) with reading and reviewing patent applications to determine what new or improved 
inventions, machines, and processes qualify for patent protection.  Each application is reviewed 
by a specific patent examiner who theoretically applies the standards of patentability in an even, 
fair, unbiased and consistent manner.  This task requires the examiner to not only be internally 
consistent with the applications she reviews but also consistent with the behavior of other 
examiners within the same technology center.2  I have conducted two studies based on data from 
hundreds of thousands of patents, thousands of examiners, and millions of Office Actions.3  Both 
studies point to consistency issues within the USPTO that may undermine the very duty with 
which it is tasked.  These studies also posit possible solutions that will help the USPTO create 
more effective guidelines and, ultimately, better patents.  Part I introduces why the efficiency 
and quality of the patent process is so important.  Part II outlines the two studies that informed 
                                                 
1  This work was funded in part by the West Virginia University College of Law Hodges Research Fund.  I 
am especially grateful to Chris Holt, Megan McLoughlin, and PatentAdvisor.com for collecting and providing most 
of these data.  I am also grateful to Ann Bartow, the University of New Hampshire, and all of the participants of the 
IP Redux conference for their helpful comments.   
2See generally Shine Sean Tu, Luck/Unluck of the Draw: An Empirical Study of Examiner Allowance Rates, 2012 
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 10, 14 (2012) [hereinafter Tu, Luck/Unluck of the Draw]; Simmons, N.R., Putting Yourself in 
the Shoes of a Patent Examiner: overview of the United States Patent and Trademark office (USPTO) Patent 
Examiner Production (Count) System, 17 J. Marshall Rev. Intell. Proper. L. 32 (2017). See also Shine S. Tu, Patent 
Examiners and Litigation Outcomes, 17 STAN. TECH. LAW REV. 507, 512-515 (2014); Wesley M. Cohen & 
Stephen A. Merrill, Patents in the Knowledge-Based Economy 24-26 (National Academy Press 2003);  
Vishnubhakat, Saurabh, The Field of Invention 45 Hofstra Law Review 899 (2017). 
3 Tu, Unluck/Luck of the Draw; Shine Sean Tu., Three New Metrics for Patent Examiner Activity: Office Actions per 
Grant Ratio (OGR), Office Actions per Disposal Ratio (ODR), and Grant to Examiner Ratio (GER), 100 J. Pat. & 
Trademark Off. Soc’y 277 (2018) [hereinafter Tu, Three New Metrics]. 
this paper and discusses the results.4  Finally, Part III summarizes what both studies suggest for 




A. Patent Office Statistics 
The USPTO is a robust office with commensurate funding and employees.  When my 
first study was conducted in 2012, the USPTO revenue was calculated at $1.4 billion, and it 
employed over 7,000 examiners.  Only five years later, its revenue skyrocketed to $2.25 billion, 
and it employed over 8,000 examiners.  The large acquisition of examiners seems to have been 
targeted at reducing the massive backlog of unexamined patents, and the strategy appears to have 
been somewhat successful.  As the table below indicates, the backlog has been reduced by over 
100,000 despite the increase in applications.  Additionally, the First Office Action pendency 
duration has gone down as examiners now typically begin responding to applications within a 
year and a half instead of the almost two years it previously took.5 
 
 FY 2012 FY 2017 
Backlog of Unexamined Patents 641,142 526,579  
                                                 
4  Shine Sean Tu, Luck/Unluck of the Draw: An Empirical Study of Examiner Allowance Rates, 2012 STAN. 
TECH. L. REV. 10, 14 (2012) [hereinafter Tu, Luck/Unluck of the Draw]; Shine Sean Tu., Three New Metrics for 
Patent Examiner Activity: Office Actions per Grant Ratio (OGR), Office Actions per Disposal Ratio (ODR), and 
Grant to Examiner Ratio (GER), 100 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 277 (2018) [hereinafter Tu, Three New 
Metrics].  
5  United States Patent Office Performance and Accountability Report Fiscal Year 2012 at 2,10, and 176.  United 
States Patent Office Performance and Accountability Report Fiscal Year 2017 at 27, 11 and 24   
Number of Applications Filed 565,566 647,388 
First Office Action Pendency 21.9  Months 16.3 Months 
Number of Examiners  7,935 Examiners 8,147 Examiners 
Total USPTO Revenue $1.72 Billion $2.25 Billion 
 
There appears to be a correlation between (1) the increase in examiners and (2) the 
modest success in reducing the backlog and in how long it takes to process the first response to a 
patent application.  Despite the mere correlation, hiring more examiners may not be the most 
effective way to process more applications and ensure that patents are given to those applications 
that meet the USPTO’s exacting standards.  Indeed, the two studies detailed below suggest that 
revising the process by which patents are reviewed as well as retaining high production 
examiners may be an even more effective way to ensure that the USPTO uses its limited 
resources wisely. 
The USPTO’s role as a protector and stimulator of innovation requires the USPTO to 
issue patents to provide incentives for inventors as well as ensuring that these incentives are 
crafted both accurately and efficiently.  Since the USPTO is a user-fee-funded governmental 
organization, it is important to make sure the USPTO does not issue patents for its own financial 
reasons.  Although the mission of the USPTO is to encourage innovation, when examiner review 
is inefficient or, even worse, done incorrectly or inconsistently, it can stifle innovation.6 
B. What is at stake? 
                                                 
6  The USPTO was formed to fulfill the mandate of Article I, Section 8, Clause 8, of the Constitution that the 
legislative branch "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” See generally Tu, Luck/Unluck of the 
Draw.  
Coverage of patent examiners who allow “bad” patents7 have been pervasive in the news.8  This 
issue has been exacerbated by the concern over non-practicing entities (NPEs).9  Issuing patents 
that do not meet the patentability requirements acts as a windfall to these patentees because these 
patentees are able to exclude others.  In previous studies, we determined some of the common 
characteristics of examiners who allow patents that are later litigated.10  Furthermore, we 
segmented the data and analyzed some of the common characteristics of examiners who allow 
patents that are not only litigated but later found invalid due to a mistake that could have been 
prevented at the USPTO.11  These mistakes can be quantified because these “bad” patents may 
be thrust into, and later invalidated, by litigation.  Accordingly, the costs of patent litigation and 
allowances of “bad” applications are high and quantifiable.12 
                                                 
7  “Bad” patents are defined as patents that should not have issued due to a failure to meet any statutory 
patentability requirements.  See Wright, D., Patently Silly from the Collapsible Walker to the Incinerating Toilet, the 
Craziest Inventions Ever Devised (the Lyons Press 2009); see also Feinberg, R. Peculiar Patents: A Collection of 
Unusual and Interesting Inventions from the Files of the U.S. Patent Office (Carol Publishing Corporation, 1994); 
Lemley, M., Lichtman, D., and Sampat, B. What to do with Bad Patents, Regulation at 10, 12-13 (Winter 2005-06); 
Merges, R.P., As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights for Business Concepts and 
Patent System Reform, 14 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 577 (1999).  
8  ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM 
IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 136-37 (2004); Doug Lichtman & Mark 
Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law’s Presumption of Validity, 60 STAN. L. REV. 45, 47-48 (2007); John R. Thomas, 
Collusion and Collective Action in the Patent System: A Proposal for Patent Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 305, 
314-16, 318-21; Jay P. Kesan, Carrots and Sticks to Create a Better Patent System, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 763, 
676-68 (2002); Christopher R. Leslie, The Anticompetitive Effects of Unenforced Invalid Patents, 91 MINN. L. REV. 
101, 133-34 (2006).   
9  Colleen Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls, 17 STANFORD TECH. L. REV. 461 (2014); Robin Feldman et al., 
The AIA 500 Expanded: The Effects of Patent Monetization Entities, 17 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 1 (2013); see also 
Michael Risch, Patent Troll Myths, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 457 (2012); David Schwartz & Jay P. Kesan, Analyzing 
the Role of Non-Practicing Entities in the Patent System, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 425 (2014); Christopher Cotropia et 
al., Unpacking Patent Assertion Entities (PAEs), 99 MINN. L. REV. 649 (2014).  
10  Shine Sean Tu, Patent Examiners and Litigation Outcomes, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 507, 512-15 (2014) 
[hereinafter Tu, Patent Examiners].   
11  Shine Sean Tu, Invalidated Patents and Associated Patent Examiners, 18 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 135, 
135-65 (2015) [hereinafter Tu, Invalidated Patents].  
12  In 2017, the median litigation cost for a patent infringement suit (inclusive of pre- and post-trial, and 
appeals when applicable) is approximately $1 million when there is $1-10 million at risk and $2 million when there 
 “Bad” patents can hinder innovation by increasing transaction costs for competitors and 
harm the public with increased product costs.  The Consumer Technology Association has 
estimated that $1.5 billion is wasted by so-called “patent trolls” every week—a staggering $78 
billion a year.13  Thus, examiners who allow “bad” patents clearly harm innovation in real, 
tangible, and quantifiable ways.  Making sure that the patents being issued by the USPTO meet 
the patentability standards, then, is a key component of fulfilling its duty as a guardian and 
fomenter of innovation.  Patent examiners are supposed to act as gatekeepers by reviewing and 
preventing invalid patents while allowing “good” patents that meet all statutory requirements. 
Accordingly, it is paramount to understand examiners’ behavior to understand how and why the 
system fails for certain applications.  
Although “bad” patents can cost Americans an extraordinary amount in litigation, the 
non-issue of “good” patents also incurs a hefty price to both innovation. 14  This price can be 
incurred in two fashions: (1) use of trade secret and (2) a decrease in investment in research and 
design.  First, firms who face constant improper rejection by examiners may simply choose to 
use trade secrets to protect their valuable intellectual property.  Use of the trade secret system 
may also hurt innovation by making it harder for competitors to invent or build upon the patented 
invention since they are kept in the dark about the current advances.  Accordingly, other firms 
may have to engage in costly duplication of development.  Second, examiners who prevent 
“good” patents from issuing can harm innovation by increasing costs for companies that are 
                                                 
is $10-$25 million at risk and $3 million when there is more than $25 million at risk.  AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW ASSOCIATION, 2017 REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 41 (2017).  
13  Patent Reform, CONSUMER TECHNOLOGY ASSOCIATION, https://www.cta.tech/Policy/Issues/Patent-
Reform.aspx (last visited June 15, 2018). 
14  “Good” patents are defined as patents that meet all statutory patentability requirements. 
investing in research and development.  By increasing innovation costs, these companies may 
invest less or stop investing in bringing groundbreaking technology to the public.15   
Examiners who delay and/or prevent “good” patents from issuing have several tools to 
force applicants to either (1) spend large amounts of money on gratuitous and merit-less appeals 
to ultimately obtain a much narrower patent than they are entitled to or (2) abandon their patent 
application completely.  Unlike litigation, this type of harm to innovation is much more difficult 
to quantify because empiricists must try to measure a null set (those patents that would have 
issued but for the examiner’s resistance to allowing the patent).  That there is a real cost, 
however, is undeniable.16 
II. Measurement of Patent Examiner Activity 
Since there is so much at stake both financially and creatively, it is critical to find a 
measure that allows us to determine how the USPTO is doing in processing applications, 
patenting “good” applications, and denying “bad” ones.   
 Anecdotal evidence has shown that some patent examiners exhibit a counterproductive 
“Examiner versus Applicant” mentality.  Some stories have described instances where patent 
examiners are proud of a low allowance rate.  In fact, the initial study for this paper resulted, in 
part, from the author’s visit to the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), and observing a sign 
extoling the examiner’s pride in a “0% allowance rate.”  As one examiner commented, “To these 
[0% allowance rate] examiners, allowances are an affront to their personal being.”17  As one can 
                                                 
15 Jaffe, A.B., and Lerner, J. Innovation and its Discontents: How our Broken Patent System is Endangering 
Innovation and Progress, and what to do about it. (Princeton University Press, 2004).  
16 There is, of course, no easy way to measure the cost. As there is currently no way of collecting data on inventors 
who had legitimately patentable inventions but abandoned the process because it became too timely or too costly. 
There have also been no studies to date that have assessed how many inventors used the trade secret system instead 
of patenting primarily because they, through real or perceived experience, felt that the patent system worked against 
them instead of with them. 
17  Personal communication with PTO primary examiners (preferred to remain anonymous).  
imagine, if a large population of examiners behaved in such a manner, our patent system would 
be failing on several levels. 
A. Unluck/Luck of the Draw18 
In order to determine the efficacy of the patent prosecution system, my first study 
focused on the allowance rate of primary and secondary examiners.19  In this study, allowance 
rate was defined as the total number of granted patents by the specific examiner divided by the 
total number of years that examiner had been at the USPTO.20  
This study focused on both primary and secondary examiners.  Primary examiners are 
more senior examiners with at least five years of experience and have full signatory authority.21  
Signatory authority allows the primary examiner sign off on his or her own Office Actions 
without review and approval by a supervisor.  Secondary examiners are junior examiners with 
less than five years of experience and do not have signatory authority.  They are supervised by 
primary examiners who edit their work and sign off on their Office Actions.22    
Perhaps unsurprisingly, my first study found that secondary examiners issue patents at a 
much lower rate than primary examiners.23  These data confirmed many of the results found in 
                                                 
18  Tu, Luck/Unluck of the Draw, supra note 2, at 14.  
19  Id.  
20  The data was edited for those years in which an examiner issues one and only one patent.  This was done 
to remove examiners with the lowest allowance rates.  These examiner years were not counted towards the 
examiner’s docket because these years may include examiners that fall within these categories: (1) those examiners 
who were only briefly at the USPTO but left before issuing more than one patent, (2) those examiners who are 
primary examiners who mainly review the work of secondary examiners but issued only one patent by themselves, 
(3) those examiners who have issued only one patent, but have not issued any since, (4) those examiners hired in 
December or late in the year, but who may have issued only one patent because of the ramp up time, and (5) those 
examiners who came back to the USPTO and needed time to re=adjust during their return year.  
21  Tu, Luck/Unluck of the Draw, supra note 2.  
22 Tu, S., Patent Examination and Litigation Outcomes. 17 Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 507 (2014). 
23 Tu, Luck/Unluck of the Draw, supra note 2, at 29. 
previous studies.24  These results were unsurprising because secondary examiners are still 
building up their docket and learning how to correctly fashion an Office Action.   
Interestingly, my first study found a small yet significant population of secondary 
examiners who had a very small number of issued patents, even though they have several years 
of experience at the PTO (See Figure 1).25  Figure 1A shows the number of secondary examiners 
in Technology Center 3700 (Mechanical Engineering, Manufacturing and Products Patents).  
There are approximately 300 examiners (17% of the examiners) out of more than 1700 
examiners in Technology Center 3700 who are secondary examiners who issue less than 5 
patents per year. Figure 1B shows that these 300 examiners issue less than 0.35% of the total 
patents (823 out of 235,686 patents) issued by all examiners in Technology Center 3700.  
Although Technology Center 3700 was used as an example, this trend was seen throughout all 
technology types.  
 
                                                 
24See Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven N. Sampat, Examiner Characteristics and Patent Office Outcomes, Rev. Econ. & 
Stat 817 (2012); see also Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven N. Sampat, Examining Patent Examination, 2010 Stan. Tech. 
L. Rev. 2 (2010); Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven N. Sampat, Is the Patent Office a Rubber Stamp?, 58 Emory L.J. 181 
(2008). 





I argue that the default response for a secondary examiner is a rejection, which creates 
this low allowance rate phenomenon seen with secondary examiners.  This ‘rejection’ default for 
secondary examiners is due to the negative consequences of an erroneous allowance.  Erroneous 
allowances can be caught by either the primary examiner or quality control, which could lead to 
negative consequences for the secondary examiner.  These negative consequences, for the most 
part, are not present with erroneous rejections.  Although erroneous rejections could be caught by 
the primary examiner, it could be argued that the secondary examiner was just being more 
careful or cautious.  Additionally, since there are no legal rights given to an applicant after a 
rejection, rejections do not receive the same scrutiny as allowances.  Accordingly, a secondary 
examiner is more likely issue a rejection rather than an allowance in an ambiguous application.   
I also observed that the population of secondary examiners with a low allowance rate 
takes much longer to issue patents.  This population of secondary examiners may be doing 
damage to the patent system by rejecting applications that would otherwise be allowed by most 
examiners.  The damage done by this population of examiners is twofold. First, these examiners 
are applying rules of patentability inconsistently from their peers. Second, these examiners 
disproportionally contribute to the backlog problem because they keep applications in 
prosecution for durations longer than necessary while expending valuable PTO resources.  These 
examiners may be rejecting applications as a default because (1) a rejection strategy can 
artificially increase the measurement used to assess examiner productivity (“counts”) and (2) 
junior examiners are in a probationary period for their first year of service, thus they may be 
more cautious of issuing “low quality” patents within the first year of service.26 
In stark contrast to secondary examiners, primary examiners issue patents far more 
quickly than secondary examiners (See Figure 2).27  Figure 2A shows the number of primary 
examiners in Technology Center 3700.  There are approximately 200 examiners (12% of the 
examiners) out of more than 1700 examiners in Technology Center 3700 who are secondary 
examiners who issue more than 50 patents per year.  Figure 2B shows that these 200 examiners 
issue more than 50% of the total patents (120,822 out of 235,686 patents) issued by all examiners 
                                                 
26  Personal communication with a PTO primary examiner (preferred to remain anonymous). See Naira R. 
Simmons, Putting Yourself in the Shoes of a Patent Examiner: Overview of the United State Patent and Trademark 
Office (USPTO) Patent Examiner Production (Count) System, 17 J. Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L. 32 (2017) for a 
general overview of count system.   
27 Tu, Luck/Unluck of the Draw, supra note 2, at 17.  
in Technology Center 3700.  This trend for primary examiners was seen throughout all 




These results may be unsurprising because it takes less time for primary examiners to 
prosecute patents to allowance when compared with secondary examiners.  Unlike secondary 
examiners, the default for a primary examiner is most likely allowance.  First, primary examiners 
have built up a larger docket of allowed patents, thus any one erroneously allowed patent is a 
much smaller percentage of the total allowed patents by that examiner.  Second, primary 
examiners are given much less time to review applications when compared to secondary 
examiners, which may contribute to primary examiners setting the default to an allowance of the 
application.  The examiner review system can allow for greater ‘counts’ by allowing patents.28 
Finally, primary examiners have more experience and may know the relevant prior art as well as 
the correct types of rejections based on the application’s claims.  For all these reasons, primary 
examiners may have the ability to get to allowance in a greater volume and quicker when 
compared to secondary examiners.  
Using the allowance rate, my first study found that the likelihood of obtaining a patent 
largely relies on the examiner assigned to the application.  In the examiner lottery, there is a low 
probability that an applicant would be assigned to a high allowance rate primary examiner, 
where the applicant would most likely receive a patent in a short period of time and with few to 
no claim amendments.  On the other hand, there is a higher probability that an applicant would 
be assigned to a low allowance rate secondary examiner, where the applicant would experience a 
long delay before acquiring a patent and/or would have to significantly limit the claims before 
issuance.  Although there is no ideal allowance rate, there are many examiners who work far 
outside the median (both on the low and high end).  This observation alone may cause concern 
for our patent system. 
B. Three New Metrics for Patent Examiner Activity29 
i. Office Action per Grant Ratio (OGR) 
Although valuable, my first study’s reliance on the generally accepted allowance rate did 
not capture the full picture of a patent application’s life.  Since the allowance rate is simply the 
                                                 
28  Simmons, supra note 18. 
29  Tu., Three New Metrics, supra note 2. 
total number of patents divided by the years of service for each examiner, the allowance rate 
metric suffers from a denominator problem.30  Specifically, the allowance rate does not account 
for the total number of applications that the examiner had in his/her docket.  Additionally, the 
allowance rate does not account for applicant abandonments.  Finally, the allowance rate cannot 
detect examiners who are “churning” applications. (i.e. applications that are in a constant state of 
prosecution but are not allowed and are not abandoned).  Accordingly, some examiners may 
have an artificially high allowance rate because of the large number of pending cases that have 
neither been abandoned nor allowed.   
To better capture what is currently going on at the PTO, then, my second study focused 
on examiners’ interactions with the patent applications and, in doing so, created three new 
metrics.31  Instead of focusing on all primary or secondary examiners who had ever worked in 
the PTO, I only looked at those who still had cases pending as of June 8, 2017 (“active” 
examiners). This dataset is a much more relevant dataset, because it captures only active 
examiners and describes what the examining core is like as of June 8, 2017.  Focusing on fewer 
examiners meant that I could also include more data—specifically, the abandonments and office 
actions, which gives a much more accurate picture of how examiners are working while also 
correcting for the denominator problem present in my initial study.32 
The first metric created from the dataset is called the “Office Action per Grant Ratio,” or 
OGR (OGR = Total # of Office Actions / Total # of Allowances).  This ratio is defined as the 
                                                 
30  Tu, Luck/Unluck of the Draw, supra note 2, at 14. 
31  Tu., Three New Metrics, supra note 2. 
32  The dataset also focuses exclusively on Utility Patents (excludes plant and design patents), includes all 
continuation, continuation-in-part, and divisional applications as well as reexaminations.  Furthermore, this dataset 
does not remove “non-original” patents.  
total number of office actions written by that examiner divided by the total number of grants.  
Accordingly, the OGR reflects the average number of office actions it takes before an examiner 
grants a patent.  This is important because many examiners may “churn” applications by giving a 
high number of office actions without an allowance or abandonment.  The OGR, unlike 
allowance rate, captures examiners who engage in this type of behavior.  Additionally, the OGR 
measures how an examiner spends his/her time at the office—either writing office actions or 
allowing cases.  Furthermore, the OGR metric does not suffer from the denominator problem 
present in the allowance rate metric, because OGR indirectly accounts for abandonments as well 
as grants by focusing on the number of Office Actions written.  Specifically, Office Actions will 
be written regardless of if the application is abandoned or granted.  
To calculate the OGR score, we isolate every current examiner at the office (every 
examiner with a pending application on their docket) and count every Office Action ever written 
by that examiner.  Then we determine how many patents that examiner has allowed during his or 
her career.  Finally, we simply divide the total number of Office Actions written by the number 
of granted patents.  The OGR score is a powerful tool because it allows the practitioner to 
determine how frequently an examiner grants a patent.   
Figure 3 shows the overall OGR for all examiners at the USPTO. 33 As seen in Figure 3, 
most examiners have an OGR of under 4.0.  This means that most examiners allow one patent 
for every four Office Actions they write. Interestingly, most of the examiners who have an OGR 
of less than 1.0 come from Technology Center 2800 (Semiconductors, Electrical and Optical 
Systems and Components).  In contrast most examiners who have an OGR score of more than 
                                                 
33 Tu, S., Three New Metrics, supra note 2, at 297.  
10.0 come from Technology Centers 3600 and 1700 (e-commerce and chemical engineering, 
respectively).   
 
 
We then segmented the data by technology center in a similar fashion to the first paper.  
We found that OGR scores were higher in technology centers 1600, 1700 and 3600 
(biotechnology, chemical engineering, and e-commerce, respectively).  Furthermore, we 
segmented the data by workgroup, and found that workgroups within technology centers could 
have widely divergent OGR scores.  An example of this variation can be seen in Figure 4, which 
shows the variation within Technology Center 1600 (Biotechnology and Organic Chemistry).34  
Figure 4 shows that there is a large percentage of examiners in 1610 (27.9%) who have an OGR 
score of more than 10.  However, Figure 4 also shows that a large percentage of examiners in 
1620 (36.4%) have an OGR score of 1.01-2.00.  This is interesting because most of the art units 
in both 1610 (5 out of 5 art units) and 1620 (4 out of 5 art units) are classified as “Drug, Bio-
                                                 
34 Tu, S., Three New Metrics, supra note 2, at 305 (Figure 10). 
Affecting and Body Treating Compositions.” However, the differences may be because many of 
these art units are associated with different Classes and Subclasses.35  These data further argue 
that examiners may not be applying the patentability rules in a consistent fashion even within 




                                                 
35  Workgroup 1610 includes Class 424 (along with many different subclasses), and Workgroup 1620 
includes Class 514 (along with several other Classes and many different subclasses).  Class 514 is “an integral part 
of Class 424” as shown by the hierarchy of class 424, and retains all pertinent definitions and Class lines of Class 
424. See United States Patent and Trademark Office, Class 424 Drug, Bio-Affecting and Body Treating 
Compositions, UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, 
https://www.uspto.gov/web/patents/classification/uspc424/sched424.htm; see also, Saurabh Vishnubhakat, The 
Field of Invention 45 HOFSTRA L. REV. 899 (2017); Heather Simmons, Categorizing the Useful Arts: Past, Present, 
and Future Development of Patent Classification in the United States, 106 Law Libr. J. 563 (2014).   
ii. Office Action per Disposal Ratio (ODR) 
The second metric created measures how long it takes for an examiner to get a 
“disposal.”  For purposes of this study, a “disposal” is defined as either an allowance or an 
abandonment.36  Office Action per Disposal (ODR) is defined as the total number of the 
examiner’s Office Actions divided by the sum of the grants and abandonments (ODR = Office 
Actions / (grants + abandonments)). The ODR gives the rate at which most examiners obtain 
either an abandonment or give an allowance.  The ODR score is a powerful took because it hints 
at how long it may take for the applicant to receive a patent.  Additionally, it helps the applicant 
determine if appeal, filing a continuation application, or abandonment is the next step forward.  
Figure 5 shows the overall ODR score at the USPTO.37  Most examiners have an ODR 
score of less than 3.0.  This means that, on average, the examiner either issues a patent or the 
applicant abandons the application for every 3 Office Actions written.   
 
                                                 
36  This study defines “disposal” differently from the USPTO.  The USPTO states that an examiner receives a 
“disposal” credit for the following actions: (a) allowance; (b) abandonment; (c) requests for continued examination 
(RCE); (d) examiner’s answer; (e) international preliminary examination report; (f) statutory invention registration 
(SIR) disposal; and (g) institution of an interference or derivation proceeding wherein the application would be in 
condition for allowance but for the interference or derivation proceeding. See also, United States Patent and 
Trademark Office, 1705 Examiner Docket, Time, and Activity Recordation [R-07.2015], UNITED STATES PATENT 
AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/s1705.html.  
37 Tu, S., Three New Metrics, supra note 2, at 311 (Figure 14). 
 
 
iii. Grant to Examiner Ratio (GER) 
The third metric created is the “Grant to Examiner Ratio” (GER).  The GER score 
determines what the specific examiner’s contribution is to the overall number of pending 
applications at the USPTO.  It is important to note that the GER is based solely on proportion of 
examiners to the total number of examiners and neither reflects any substantive analysis of the 
applications nor takes into account any technological differences. 
The GER is calculated by determining the percentage of patents examined divided by the 
percentage of examiners within a certain OGR segment regardless of Workgroup or Technology 
Center.  If the GER is equal to 1, then the cohort grants patents in a manner consistent with the 
percentage of examiners in that cohort.  Put another way, if the segment of examiners reviewed 
is 25% of the total active examiners, we would expect that cohort to issue 25% of the total 
number of patents. If this is true, the GER would equal 1.   
Figure 6 shows the GER for each OGR group.38  As seen in Figure 6, examiners with 
OGR scores between 0.01 and 3.00 have GER scores over 1.  This means that these examiners 
contribute to decreasing the backlog of unexamined patents at the USPTO.  In contrast, all 
examiners with OGR scores over 3.01 have a GER score of less than 1.  This means that 
examiners with OGR scores more than 3.00 do not contribute to removing the backlog of 






My first study suffered from a lack of data problem.39  Specifically, without data 
regarding the number of abandonments in each examiner’s docket, it was impossible to calculate 
                                                 
38 Tu, S., Three New Metrics, supra note 2, at 308 (Figure 13). 
39Tu, Luck/Unluck of the Draw, supra note 2, at 14. 
the true examiner allowance rates.  This new study corrects this problem by adding information 
about office actions and abandonments from 9,535 examiners.40  Additionally, this study creates 
several new metrics to detail current examiner activity at the USPTO.   
Although this study does not focus on any of the substantive rejections in each Office 
Action, there are two main trends that are troubling.  First, there is a small population of 
examiners who allow patents at a high rate.  This may be problematic if these examiners are not 
reviewing or applying the patentability standards in a rigorous manner.  Second, on the opposite 
side of the spectrum, there are a significant number of examiners who reject patents at a high 
rate.  This may also be problematic if these examiners are applying the patentability standards 
too stringently or unreasonably.  
These results suggest that the USPTO should more closely survey the prosecution docket 
for examiners who have OGR scores that are several standard deviations from the mean.  
Examination of individual prosecution histories may help determine which group of examiners 
are hurting innovation more.  Furthermore, the UPSTO could examine the litigation rates for 
those examiners with high versus low OGR in a fashion that I have previous done.41  This type of 
analysis would help determine which examiners are disproportionately contributing to 
unnecessary litigation.  Additionally, substantive analysis of the office actions of high OGR 
versus low OGR examiners may help increase both productivity as well as consistency at the 
USPTO.   
                                                 
40  Tu., Three New Metrics, supra note 2. 
41  Tu, Patent Examiners, supra note 6; Tu, Invalidated Patents, supra note 7.   
